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OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal, which presents issues of statutory 
interpretation, stems from a tragic automobile crash that killed 
the intoxicated driver and seriously injured the sole passenger.  
Encompass Insurance Company (“Encompass”), the liability 
carrier for the vehicle, settled the passenger’s claims against 
the driver’s estate and all other possible parties, including 
Stone Mansion Restaurant Incorporated (“Stone Mansion”) — 
the restaurant that allegedly overserved the driver.  Thereafter, 
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Encompass brought the instant action against Stone Mansion 
in Pennsylvania state court, seeking contribution under state 
law.  Stone Mansion removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  
Following a dispute over removal, the District Court concluded 
that the case was properly before it and later dismissed the case 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
Encompass appeals both the decision on the removal and the 
dismissal.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm in part 
and reverse in part. 
 
I. 
 
 On the night of March 20 and the early morning of 
March 21, 2011, Brian Viviani attended an event at Stone 
Mansion, a restaurant in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  The 
restaurant allegedly furnished him with alcohol until he 
became intoxicated and then continued to serve him alcohol.  
Thereafter, Viviani left Stone Mansion and drove away in an 
automobile with Helen Hoey, who had hosted the event.  After 
Viviani drove a short distance, the vehicle struck a guardrail 
and flipped onto its roof, killing him and causing Hoey 
significant injury. 
 
 Hoey filed a civil action against Viviani’s estate on July 
25, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania.  She alleged that the accident occurred because 
Viviani was driving while intoxicated.  His estate tendered the 
defense against the lawsuit to Encompass, which was at all 
relevant times the liability insurance carrier for the vehicle.  
Encompass reached a settlement agreement with Hoey, 
whereby it paid her $600,000 and she released her claims 
against all possible defendants. 
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 Encompass, a citizen of Illinois, then brought the instant 
action against Stone Mansion, a Pennsylvania corporation, in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.  Encompass 
alleged that:  (1) it stands in the shoes of the insured, Viviani’s 
estate; (2) Stone Mansion served Viviani alcohol while he was 
visibly intoxicated; (3) “[u]nder Pennsylvania’s Dram Shop 
law, a business or individual who serves alcohol to a visibly 
intoxicated person is legally responsible for any damage that 
person might cause”; and (4) as a joint tortfeasor under the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act (“UCATA”), 
Stone Mansion is liable to Encompass for contribution.  
Appendix (“App.”) 36–44. 
 
 In email correspondence between counsel for 
Encompass and for Stone Mansion, counsel for Stone Mansion 
agreed to accept electronic service of process instead of 
requiring formal service.  Specifically, counsel for Stone 
Mansion informed counsel for Encompass that “[i]n the event 
your client chooses to file suit in this matter, I will be 
authorized to accept service of process” and that “if and when 
you do file, provide your Complaint to me along with an 
Acceptance form.”1  App. 85.  Minutes later, counsel for 
Encompass replied in relevant part, “Thank you . . . for 
agreeing to accept service.”  Id.  On January 23, 2017, 
Encompass sent Stone Mansion a copy of the filed complaint 
                                              
1 In lieu of the usual manner of service, Pennsylvania’s 
Rules of Civil Procedure permit a “defendant or his authorized 
agent [to] accept service of original process by filing a separate 
document” that is “substantially in the [provided] form.”  Pa. 
R. Civ. P. 402(b).  The form provided contains a caption, the 
heading “Acceptance of Service,” and a brief statement that the 
undersigned accepts service and is authorized to do so. 
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and a service acceptance form via email.  Counsel for Stone 
Mansion replied, “I will hold the acceptance of service until I 
get the docket n[umber].”  App. 92.  That same day, 
Encompass provided the docket number; however, Stone 
Mansion did not return the acceptance form.  App. 95, 99.  
Instead, on January 26, counsel for Stone Mansion responded: 
 
Thank you for your patience in this regard. . . .  I 
want to explain why I have not yet returned the 
Acceptance of Service form. 
Noting that there is diversity of 
citizenship, and an amount in controversy in 
excess of $75,000, we are considering removing 
this action to federal court.  While 28 USC [sic] 
§1441(b) generally prevents a resident defendant 
from removing an action to federal court in its 
own state, the language of the statute precludes 
such removal when a resident defendant has been 
“properly joined and served”.  We are aware of 
an opinion from Chief Judge Conti in the 
Western District of PA, interpreting this to mean 
that a resident defendant can remove prior to 
being served. 
I fully acknowledge having agreed prior 
to your filing suit that we will accept service.  I 
maintain that agreement, but because it may 
affect our client’s procedural ability to remove 
the case, I have to hold off doing so until after 
the Notice of Removal is filed.  I expect this will 
happen in the next one or two days.  Happy to 
discuss this with you over the phone if you 
desire. 
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App. 99. 
 
Thereafter, prior to formal acceptance, Stone Mansion 
timely removed the matter to the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Encompass filed a 
motion to remand the matter to the Pennsylvania state trial 
court on the grounds that removal was improper pursuant to the 
forum defendant rule; however, the District Court denied the 
motion.  The District Court concluded that the forum defendant 
rule does not apply because it precludes removal only “if any 
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 
defendants is a citizen of the State in which [the] action is 
brought” and because Stone Mansion’s counsel “did not accept 
service of [Encompass’] Complaint until after [it] filed a 
Notice of Removal.”  App. 3–4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441). 
 
Stone Mansion then moved to dismiss the action under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that 
Pennsylvania’s Dram Shop law establishes liability for liquor 
licensees only “in favor of third persons on account of damages 
inflicted upon them” and that neither Encompass nor the estate 
of Viviani are in that class of persons.  App. 104–08.  The 
District Court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, 
noting: 
 
The plain, unambiguous reading of [the Dram 
Shop law] indicates that a licensee, such as Stone 
Mansion, is liable only to third persons (Hoey in 
this case), for damages inflicted upon the third 
person — off the licensee’s premises — by a 
customer of the licensee (Viviani in this case), 
but only when the licensee furnishes that 
customer (Viviani) with alcohol when he was 
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visibly intoxicated.  [The Dram Shop law], with 
its limited scope, indicates that Stone Mansion 
may have been liable to Hoey — depending upon 
whether Stone Mansion served Viviani alcohol 
while he was visibly intoxicated.  Encompass’ 
Complaint establishes that Encompass is acting 
as if it were Viviani in order to recover under 
Pennsylvania’s Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act.  Because the[r]e is no potential 
cognizable claim under [the Dram Shop law] as 
between Viviani/Encompass and Stone 
Mansion, there is likewise no claim for 
contribution, and thus, Stone Mansion’s Motion 
to Dismiss will be granted. 
 
App. 16.  Encompass then filed a motion for reconsideration, 
arguing that it was not proceeding under the Dram Shop law, 
but rather the UCATA.  Encompass contended that it had 
included the Dram Shop law in its complaint and previous 
briefings “only to establish that the Stone Mansion was a joint 
tortfeasor in the action brought by Hoey — i.e. a person jointly 
or severally liable in tort.”  App. 150.  The District Court 
denied the motion for reconsideration, noting that the relevant 
provision of the Dram Shop law “limits a liquor licensee’s 
liability, whereas Encompass’ argument sought to expand a 
licensee’s liability.”  App. 20.  Encompass timely filed a notice 
of appeal. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  Because the District Court’s dismissal of the 
action and denial of the motion for reconsideration constitute 
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final decisions, this Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 “We exercise plenary review over the denial of a motion 
to remand to the extent that the underlying basis is a legal 
question. . . .”  Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 
at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 287 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We likewise exercise plenary review of a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 
824 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2016).  We must “accept all factual 
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.”  Id. (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 
III. 
 
On appeal, Encompass raises two issues:  (1) whether 
the District Court erred in denying Encompass’ motion to 
remand the matter to the Pennsylvania state trial court; and (2) 
whether the District Court erred in dismissing the matter. 
 
A. 
 
 We first consider whether the District Court erred in 
denying Encompass’ motion to remand this case to the 
Pennsylvania state trial court.  Removal of state court actions 
to federal district court is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–55.  
The general removal statute provides: 
 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act 
of Congress, any civil action brought in a State 
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court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to 
the district court of the United States for the 
district and division embracing the place where 
such action is pending. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  Where federal jurisdiction is premised 
only on diversity of the parties, the forum defendant rule 
applies.  That rule provides that “[a] civil action otherwise 
removable solely on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] may 
not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined 
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such 
action is brought.”  Id. § 1441(b)(2).  This Court has long held 
that the forum defendant rule is procedural rather than 
jurisdictional, except where “the case could not initially have 
been filed in federal court.”  Korea Exch. Bank, N.Y. Branch 
v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 50 (3d Cir. 1995); see 
also Roxbury Condo. Ass’n v. Anthony S. Cupo Agency, 316 
F.3d 224, 227 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
1. 
 
 Encompass first argues that the District Court 
misinterpreted the forum defendant rule, ignoring its intent and 
construing it “in a manner that necessarily would create a 
nonsensical result that Congress could not have intended.”  
Encompass Br. 11.  When interpreting a statute, we “must 
begin with the statutory text.”  United States v. Moreno, 727 
F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013).  “It is well-established that, 
‘[w]here the text of a statute is unambiguous, the statute should 
be enforced as written and only the most extraordinary 
showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will 
 10 
justify a departure from that language.’”  McMaster v. E. 
Armored Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 
295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011)).  Nevertheless, it is also a “basic tenet 
of statutory construction . . . that courts should interpret a law 
to avoid absurd or bizarre results.”  In re Kaiser Aluminum 
Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Moreno, 727 
F.3d at 259 (noting that “[w]hen the statute’s language is plain, 
the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition 
required by the te[x]t is not absurd — is to enforce it according 
to its terms” (quoting Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 
534 (2004)).  An absurd interpretation is one that “defies 
rationality or renders the statute nonsensical and superfluous.”  
Moreno, 727 F.3d at 259 (quoting United States v. Fontaine, 
697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 
Starting with the text, we conclude that the language of 
the forum defendant rule in section 1441(b)(2) is unambiguous.  
Its plain meaning precludes removal on the basis of in-state 
citizenship only when the defendant has been properly joined 
and served.  Thus, it remains for us to determine whether there 
has been a “most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions” 
and consider whether this literal interpretation leads to “absurd 
or bizarre results.”2 
                                              
2 We note that district courts that have considered 
application of the forum defendant rule to pre-service removal 
are split on the issue.  Compare, e.g., Parker Hannifin Corp. v. 
Fed. Ins. Co., 23 F. Supp. 3d 588, 596 (W.D. Pa. 2014) 
(concluding that “the forum defendant rule does not apply to 
this case because plaintiffs failed to properly serve [the in-state 
defendant] prior to removal of this case to federal court”); 
Valido-Shade v. Wyeth, LLC, 875 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478 (E.D. 
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We therefore turn to section 1441, which contains the 
forum defendant rule.  Section 1441 exists in part to prevent 
favoritism for in-state litigants, Dresser Indus., Inc. v. 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 106 F.3d 494, 499 (3d Cir. 
1997), and discrimination against out-of-state litigants, 
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968).  The 
specific purpose of the “properly joined and served” language 
in the forum defendant rule is less obvious.  The legislative 
history provides no guidance; however, courts and 
commentators have determined that Congress enacted the rule 
“to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal by joining as a 
defendant a resident party against whom it does not intend to 
proceed, and whom it does not even serve.”  Arthur Hellman, 
et al., Neutralizing the Strategem of “Snap Removal”: A 
Proposed Amendment to the Judicial Code, 9 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 
103, 108 (2016) (quoting Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 
575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also Goodwin v. 
                                              
Pa. 2012) (applying the plain meaning of § 1441(b), permitting 
pre-service removal by an in-state defendant, and noting that if 
the consequences of this result are “deemed to be bad public 
policy, the remedy lies with Congress which, subject to 
constitutional limitations, controls the scope of this court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction and any right of removal”); with, 
e.g., Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 
641–43, 654 (D.N.J. 2008) (concluding that literal 
interpretation of the forum defendant rule would lead to an 
absurd result and remanding the matter); Vivas v. Boeing Co., 
486 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (remanding the 
matter on the basis that “to allow a resident defendant to 
remove a case before a plaintiff even has a chance to serve him 
would provide a vehicle for defendants to manipulate the 
operation of the removal statutes”). 
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Reynolds, 757 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting the 
same).  
 
 Citing this fraudulent-joinder rationale, Encompass 
argues that it is “inconceivable” that Congress intended the 
“properly joined and served” language to permit an in-state 
defendant to remove an action by delaying formal service of 
process.  Encompass Br. 13–14.  This argument is unavailing.  
Congress’ inclusion of the phrase “properly joined and served” 
addresses a specific problem — fraudulent joinder by a 
plaintiff — with a bright-line rule.  Permitting removal on the 
facts of this case does not contravene the apparent purpose to 
prohibit that particular tactic.3  Our interpretation does not defy 
rationality or render the statute nonsensical or superfluous, 
because:  (1) it abides by the plain meaning of the text; (2) it 
envisions a broader right of removal only in the narrow 
circumstances where a defendant is aware of an action prior to 
service of process with sufficient time to initiate removal;4 and 
                                              
3 We are also mindful of the Supreme Court’s direction 
that “by interpretation we should not defeat” Congress’ 
purpose of abridging the right of removal.  See La Chemise 
Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(quoting Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 12 (1951)).  
However, as we determined in a related context, we conclude 
that this general rule is “not sufficient to displace the plain 
meaning” of the statute.  Delalla v. Hanover Ins., 660 F.3d 180, 
189 (3d Cir. 2011) (considering language pertaining to 
procedure for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). 
4 We are aware of the concern that technological 
advances since enactment of the forum defendant rule now 
permit litigants to monitor dockets electronically, potentially 
giving defendants an advantage in a race-to-the-courthouse 
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(3) it protects the statute’s goal without rendering any of the 
language unnecessary.  Thus, this result may be peculiar in that 
it allows Stone Mansion to use pre-service machinations to 
remove a case that it otherwise could not; however, the 
outcome is not so outlandish as to constitute an absurd or 
bizarre result.   
 
In short, Stone Mansion has availed itself of the plain 
meaning of the statute, for which there is precedential support.  
Encompass has not provided, nor have we otherwise 
uncovered, an extraordinary showing of contrary legislative 
intent.  Furthermore, we do not perceive that the result in this 
case rises to the level of the absurd or bizarre.  There are simply 
no grounds upon which we could substitute Encompass’ 
interpretation for the literal interpretation.  Reasonable minds 
might conclude that the procedural result demonstrates a need 
for a change in the law; however, if such change is required, it 
is Congress — not the Judiciary — that must act. 
 
2. 
 
 We next consider whether the District Court erred by 
declining to remand the matter on grounds of preclusion.  
Again, we conclude that it did not.  Encompass argues that 
                                              
removal scenario.  However, the briefs fail to address this 
concern, let alone argue that the practice is widespread.  If a 
significant number of potential defendants (1) electronically 
monitor dockets; (2) possess the ability to quickly determine 
whether to remove the matter before a would-be state court 
plaintiff can serve process; and (3) remove the matter contrary 
to Congress’ intent, the legislature is well-suited to address the 
issue. 
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because Stone Mansion had agreed to accept service 
electronically, it was precluded from arguing for removal on 
grounds of incomplete service of process.  Encompass Br. 18.  
Encompass suggests that Stone Mansion’s “assurances . . . that 
it would accept service were the only reason that Encompass 
did not take steps to have Stone Mansion served by sheriff 
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure” and 
argues that Stone Mansion itself caused the lack of service.  
Encompass Br. 19; Encompass Reply Br. 10.  Stone Mansion 
argues that although it agreed to accept electronic service, it 
never indicated that it “would not avail itself of federal 
jurisdiction.”  Stone Mansion Br. 37. 
 
 We are mindful, as Encompass points out in its briefs, 
that the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit 
lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” Pa. Rules of Prof. Conduct 
8.4; however, we need not pass judgment on whether Stone 
Mansion violated this rule, because Encompass has failed to 
provide any support for the proposition that Stone Mansion’s 
conduct carried preclusive effect.  We also discount 
Encompass’ unsupported argument that Stone Mansion’s 
agreement to accept service (the Pennsylvania state court 
method) rather than to waive service (the federal court method) 
required it to submit to state court jurisdiction.  Finally, we 
conclude that Encompass’ position is not saved by its emphasis 
on the District Court’s finding that Stone Mansion agreed to 
accept service of a state court complaint.  By its nature, 
removal of a matter from state to federal court presupposes the 
existence of a state court complaint.  Stone Mansion’s 
statements of its willingness to accept electronic service did not 
include language regarding its position on jurisdiction and 
removal.  For these reasons, we are unconvinced that Stone 
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Mansion’s conduct — even if unsavory — precludes it from 
arguing that incomplete service permits removal.  As a result, 
the District Court’s order denying Encompass’ motion to 
remand will be affirmed. 
 
B. 
 
 Having determined that the case was properly removed 
to federal court, we turn next to whether the District Court 
erred in granting Stone Mansion’s motion to dismiss.  As noted 
above, the District Court dismissed the claim because it 
concluded that “the[r]e is no potential cognizable claim under 
[the Pennsylvania Dram Shop law] as between 
Viviani/Encompass and Stone Mansion,” and, as a result, 
“there is likewise no claim for contribution.”  App. 16.  
Encompass argues that the UCATA provides for contribution 
among joint tortfeasors, and that the language of the Dram 
Shop law does not preclude recovery for contribution. 
 
 In relevant part, the UCATA establishes that, as a 
general rule, “[t]he right of contribution exists among joint 
tort-feasors.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8324(a).  The statute also 
provides that “[a] joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement 
with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution 
from another joint tort-feasor whose liability to the injured 
person is not extinguished by the settlement.”  Id. § 8324(c).  
The Dram Shop law addresses a more specific area of state law, 
providing: 
No licensee shall be liable to third persons on 
account of damages inflicted upon them off of 
the licensed premises by customers of the 
licensee unless the customer who inflicts the 
damages was sold, furnished or given liquor or 
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malt or brewed beverages by the said licensee or 
his agent, servant or employee when the said 
customer was visibly intoxicated. 
47 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 4-497.  In Pennsylvania, “[a] 
violation of [the Dram Shop law] is deemed negligence per se.”  
Johnson v. Harris, 615 A.2d 771, 775 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); 
see also Detwiler v. Brumbaugh, 656 A.2d 944, 946 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995) (noting that § 4-497 does not create a cause of action, 
but rather limits the licensee’s liability for breach of a duty “to 
refrain from selling liquor to a visibly intoxicated individual”). 
 
 On appeal, Stone Mansion argues that Encompass is 
outside the “class of persons that Section 4-497 was designed 
to protect.”  Stone Mansion Br. 22.  It relies primarily upon 
Juszczyszyn v. Taiwo, 113 A.3d 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) in 
support of that argument.  That opinion, however, is inapposite.  
The plaintiff in Juszczyszyn, a police officer who was injured 
when he confronted an intoxicated patron in a bar, sought 
recovery under § 4-497, not contribution under the UCATA.  
Unlike that officer, Encompass does not claim that it suffered 
an injury compensable under § 4-497, but rather contends that 
Stone Mansion’s status as a joint tortfeasor in Hoey’s injury 
makes Stone Mansion responsible for contribution under the 
UCATA.  Thus, the officer in Juszczyszyn is not analogous to 
Encompass in this litigation. 
   
 By its plain language, § 4-497 limits the liability of 
liquor licensees in a specific manner:  third persons like Hoey, 
having been injured by a customer of the licensee, can only 
recover from the licensee if it served alcohol to that customer 
when he or she was visibly intoxicated.  Nothing in that 
language shields licensees from responsibility for contribution 
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among joint tortfeasors for the harm caused to protected third-
parties.  It does not matter that Encompass is not in the class of 
third parties envisioned in § 4-497 of the Dram Shop law.  
Encompass is not seeking to recover against Stone Mansion 
under § 4-497.  Instead, because Encompass’ settlement 
agreement with Hoey extinguished Stone Mansion’s potential 
liability to her, Encompass is entitled to pursue a contribution 
claim against Stone Mansion under the UCATA. 
 
As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has noted: 
 
The focus of the [UCATA] is on the relationship 
existing between tortfeasors rather than the 
manner in which several tortfeasors have been 
held liable to an injured claimant.  In Puller v. 
Puller, [] 110 A.2d 175, 177 (1955), the 
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court observed that 
“contribution is not a recovery for the tort . . . [,] 
but the enforcement of an equitable duty to share 
liability for the wrong done.”  Thus, a 
tortfeasor’s right to receive contribution from a 
joint tortfeasor derives not from his liability to 
the claimant but rather from the equitable 
principle that once the joint liability of several 
tortfeasors has been determined, it would be 
unfair to impose the financial burden of the 
plaintiff’s loss on one tortfeasor to the exclusion 
of the other.  It matters not on which theory a 
tortfeasor has been held responsible for the tort 
committed against the plaintiff.  So long as the 
party seeking contribution has paid in excess of 
his or her share of liability, it would be 
inequitable under the [UCATA] to deny that 
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party’s right to contribution from a second 
tortfeasor who also contributed to the plaintiff’s 
injury. 
 
Svetz v. Land Tool Co., 513 A.2d 403, 407 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  On these facts, 
equity demands — and the Dram Shop Law does not prevent 
— the possibility of contribution from the licensee to the 
insurer of the intoxicated customer.  This will encourage 
insurers to settle claims and incentivize licensees to serve 
alcohol responsibly, which will benefit Pennsylvania’s citizens 
and promote the Dram Shop law’s aim of protecting society 
from the negligent service of alcohol.   
 
In conclusion, Encompass does not argue that it is 
entitled to recovery in tort against Stone Mansion.  Such a 
claim would likely fail pursuant to § 4-497’s limiting 
provision.  Instead, Encompass presents a distinct claim for 
contribution under the UCATA.  Pennsylvania’s Dram Shop 
law does not prohibit this manner of recovery.  Therefore, the 
District Court erred by dismissing the case. 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
 
